Prompt Injection Defense: Secure Your LLM Applications Against the OWASP Top 10 Attacks and Adversarial Exploits

Your LLM application is one crafted sentence away from a data breach - here is the six-layer architecture that stops it. EchoLeak pulled enterprise data from Microsoft 365 Copilot via a single email. GitLab Duo exfiltrated code through a Markdown image tag. The Atlas attack chain sent a developer's resignation letter. These breaches happened to security-aware teams who thought they had defenses in place. This book builds the SHIELD framework: six independent, production-ready defense layers for Python-based LLM applications. Every chapter delivers working code and real CVEs, not theory. - Build a semantic validation pipeline that catches injection attempts keyword filters miss - Implement a DLP output scanner that blocks exfiltration before users see it - Harden system prompts using 13 AppSec-derived guidelines that reduce extraction surface - Secure RAG pipelines with ingestion scanning, provenance tagging, and groundedness evaluation - Architect least-privilege agents with MCP manifest verification and human confirmation gates - Run automated red-team tests with Garak, PyRIT, and Promptfoo against your full application stack - Detect successful injections in production using behavioral anomaly signals across sessions - Execute a four-phase incident response playbook specific to LLM security breaches - Map your defenses to OWASP LLM Top 10, NIST AI RMF, and SOC 2 audit requirements >Each chapter builds one layer of the SHIELD framework (Semantic input validation, Hardened output filtering, Instruction hardening, Envelope/RAG security, Least-privilege agent architecture, Detection and response) with annotated Python code you can drop into a real application. Case studies include EchoLeak, Morris II, the OpenAI Atlas attack chain, Google Gemini Calendar injection, and GitLab Duo - all documented production breaches analyzed at the component level. For Python developers, AI engineers, and security architects building LLM applications that handle real user data. Stop trusting the model to protect itself. Build the architecture that does.

Pages: 283, Paperback, Independently published