Mathematical Economics Volume III of IV: Equilibrium, Strategy and Uncertainty

The book's argument moves from constrained choice to markets, from markets to strategic and institutional interaction, and from those interactions to data, computation, and public judgement. It begins with familiar objects-preferences, technologies, budgets, prices, and choices-because they are the grammar through which later objects become comparable. It then refuses to treat the grammar as the world. Institutions, distribution, information, coercion, and environmental constraints alter both the feasible set and the meaning of an observed choice. The later chapters introduce machine learning, algorithmic pricing, autonomous agents, safety, privacy, causal inference, structural estimation, simulation, and reproducible research. These are not ornamental additions to an inherited syllabus. They test whether the elementary disciplines of economics still hold when decisions are mediated by systems that classify, recommend, negotiate, and act at scale. The conclusion is intentionally procedural rather than doctrinal. A capable microeconomic argument defines its primitives, constructs its feasible set, derives the relevant relation, distinguishes theorem from computation and evidence, reports sensitivity, and names the point at which further confidence would require further knowledge. That is a demanding habit, but it is kinder than certainty acquired by omission.