An Introduction to Auction Theory

Offering an introduction to Auction theory, this book discusses the basic independent-private-model, introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behavior and the seller's expected revenue, mechanism design, and the theory of multi-object auctions. It is meant for use in economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.